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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROCESS OF
JUSTIFYING CHOICES IN A CONTROVERSIAL
UNIVERSE
Olivier GODARD
Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le
Développement (CIRED) - - URA 940, CNRS
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
"Sustainability is not regarded seriously by those who really count,
namely those at the top of political structures and those who control
the flows of national and international capital. (...)  One can only be
cautious about an effective future role for the concept of
sustainability.  It is probably going to languish as a `good idea’
which cannot be put into practice -- like `democracy’ and
`accountability’." (O’Riordan 1988)
1. The Social Project of Sustainability, a Cloak for Various Absences
This paper focuses on the study of sustainability as a candidate principle of legitimacy.
Its purpose is firstly to highlight the potential of this principle and then to identify
sources of the disenchantment that has contributed to its current ambiguous and
controversial status.
The primary task of language is to name what is not self-evident and to bring
absent beings onto the social stage. By this, a symbolic world is formed to transcend the
immediacy of conspicuous presences and absences, and thus provide the means for
interpretation. Under the appearance of positive and unquestionable comprehensiveness
exuded by the notion of sustainability lie a set of profoundly unsettling lacks and
absences. These lacks and absences are felt on a number of levels:
  • Many people worldwide believe that the physical and social transformation
processes under way, partially represented as a development process, are
incompatible with the perpetuation of the world familiar to them and to which
they are extremely attached. This incompatibility even holds true for what was
hitherto considered to be the most secure and, on the level of a human life, the
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most stable of elements such as the climate. They also believe that these changes
are becoming unbearable for a large and growing number of human beings
plunged not only into material misery, but also into social exclusion and cultural
destruction. The fear is (often unvoiced):  will there even be a future world for
humanity?  Will humanity find a way to be fit for inhabitation?
  • Beings who are absent from the social, economic and political stages on which
development paths are chosen in the shadows of a half-consciousness swayed by
minor and major decisions are newly acknowledged with legitimate interests and
values:  groups being the victims of social exclusion, who have neither the power
nor the means to make themselves heard;  future generations of humans still in
limbo to whom some parties propose giving rights before they are born into the
world;  possibly, according to others, non-human living beings whose life courses
unfurl on the same planet as us, and even those collective beings forming
ecosystems, biomes and the biosphere. The question raised here concerns the
principle and methods used to represent the interests and values attached to these
absent subjects for their own sake, becoming by necessity “reference” subjects
rather than “preference” subjects as they are not players in the public space
formed “here and now”.
  • Social actors still hesitate over, and have trouble agreeing on, the collective
conduct to be adopted to sort out their relationships with the biophysical world
that forms their environment.  This hesitation and diffidence concerns firstly the
very definition of situations and “common worlds”, on which action relies to be
pertinent. Yet it also concerns the basic principles to which stakeholders could
and should refer in order to solve their differences of opinion, and criteria deemed
legitimate to which they would agree to defer in order to define fair action in
accordance with such principles. Over and above their inefficiency, public
environmental policies have always suffered and still suffer a legitimacy problem
(Godard, 1989, 1990). 1  The reference to the aim of sustainability is an attempt to
dispel this problem, but the fact that the lack is named does not mean that it is
made good. Hence the fourth level described below.
  • There may be a lack of consistency and legitimacy in the doctrine of sustainable
development when it is raised from the status of a simple “good idea” to a general
principle of judgement for determining what is just and appropriate. This
shortcoming can be associated with various reasons relating to both the field of
                    
  1 This legitimacy problem should be understood as simultaneously referring to the hesitation over
the justification universes to which the problems in question should be referred and the lack of appropriate
representation of these problems in each of these universes. This characterisation can be likened to what
Brian Wynne (1992) called “indeterminacy”, as opposed to the uncertainty that could be reduced by a greater
research effort to track down the statistical relationships. This indeterminacy concerns the basic agreements
relating to operations of description and classification, which enable equivalence relations to be found
between situations and between objects.
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principles and the institutional and practical facilities likely to be used to
implement these principles:
--  The conceptual uncertainties and the vagueness of the terms used in the
doctrine of sustainability;
--  The incompatibility manifest in some theoretical views of sustainability
compared with the axiomatic framework common to the different principles of
legitimacy operating today in Western democratic societies -- that is, the founding
precepts of the “city” model 2 as described by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991),
summarised in Figure 1;
--  The lack of support from objects and causal relations, even though they are
needed to make the justification tests stand up, in these controversial universes 3
currently underlying the main problems affecting the global environment;
--  The shortage of sufficiently well-defined indicators, procedures and tests for
sustainability, adequate to resolve disagreements.
For all these reasons, the initial shortcoming to which the invention of the notion of
sustainability was intended to be a response is aggravated by a more serious deficiency,
as the new barely brandished principle crumbles or as fear develops over the new
monsters to which it could ultimately give birth. 4  This risk is rising because lassitude
mixed with the desire to plaster over the cracks can lead our contemporaries, without
any real conviction, to leave the field open to actions taken by bureaucracies in search of
new ways to assert their power and authority, to the ideological terrorism of small
prophetic groups, and to the strategic manoeuvres of major industrial and business
organisations now inclined to present themselves as the new guardians of collective
legitimacy.
                    
 2 This model presents in a synthetic way the main principles of legitimacy at work in contemporary
Western society.  We make use of it here without going into the details of its origins and specification.
 3 These controversial universes, as opposed to stable universes, are defined by the following
properties (Godard, 1992, 1993):  the primacy of the scientific and social construction of problems over the
direct perception by the people;  the weight of scientific controversies and uncertainties affecting aspects of
essential phenomena from the point of view of action;  the importance taken by the distinct representation of
the interests of third parties absent from the decision-making stage of “here and now”;  the presumption of
irreversibility affecting phenomena deemed non-subordinate and therefore preventing the expectation of the
stabilisation of the state of knowledge from becoming an indisputable strategy.
 4 In France, this concern about the new social and political monsters that the notion of
sustainability, seen as the “new ecological order”, could generate is well illustrated by the media success of
Luc Ferry’s theses (1992) in the run up to the 1993 general election and the often passionate rejection of Hans
Jonas’ proposals (1990), even though both reactions were based on misinterpretations and oversimplifications
(see Hourcade, 1993;  and Ricoeur, 1993).
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2. The Need for Public Justification
The search for agreement on collective actions and rules intended to manage individual
conduct and conflicts over the respective positions of members in a society is subject to
a general requirement of public justification. Debates, tests and judgements involved
draw on some basic agreements and conventions, which we will call “common superior
principles” following Boltanski and Thévenot (1991). It is at the end of such
justification work that actions undertaken or new norms and classifications adopted will
be seen as legitimate. Examples of this type of process can be found in court cases,
motor races and economic calculations of the profitability of an investment. They are all
tests, even though they correspond to different situations, intended to determine the
appropriate action or order. The requirement is twofold:  to find a suitable response to
the specific circumstances of the situation requiring a judgement, but also to link the
situation to a more general representation of an ideal order supposed to sustain a
common good shared by all the members of the society.
Understanding the concept of legitimacy in this way, it can be said that the idea of
sustainable development is presented and used today by many groups, organisations and
institutions as a new standard for justifying actions taken in the many areas of
technological and economic development, demographic growth, town and country
planning, natural resource use and exploitation, and biophysical environmental
protection, to name but some of the fields identified using their most common names.
3. Sustainability as a Rhetorical Resource for Criticism
However, far from being firmly established for its positive content, the sustainable
development requirement is first and foremost used to back up arguments criticising
current situations and practices:  for example, your industrial, demographic, agricultural
(and so on) development is not sustainable!  Now, this sort of statement is not just an
objectively scientific observation, but rather is an objection, a criticism and a demand
for explanations: “By not being sustainable, your development is harming others” -- that
is, all those others whom the speaker is claiming to represent.  And the spokesperson
continues with, “You are overstepping your rights, you are not respecting your
obligations, you should make amends or at least take steps to put a stop to this
intolerable situation.”
There is no lack of examples of such denunciations. The history of the emergence
of this notion is littered with them.  Moreover, they come from all directions. Accusers
and accused swap roles as if in a game of table tennis where the ball changes according
to the direction of play.  For example, in relation to the climatic risk associated with the
increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, consider the argument put forward
by a London-based non-governmental organisation called the Global Commons Institute
(GCI). This NGO had an institutional and media success in March 1993 when it
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presented a shocking figure establishing the extreme illegitimacy of the development
styles of industrialised countries and the underlying international economic order. 5  It
was estimated that the poor Southern countries pay the industrialised countries an annual
energy consumption subsidy of 3.4 trillion dollars. In return, the Northern countries, in
the form of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), conditionally offer a sum equal to
a mere 0.00006% of their “debt” to the South! This revelation is supposed to be based
on the idea of sustainability, interpreted as a normative and even legal principle as it
leads to concepts of debt and obligation. The hypothesis is as follows. According to the
first report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Houghton et
al., 1990), global emissions need to be reduced by 60% in order to stabilise the
atmospheric concentration of CO2 at 1990 levels. This would leave a residual level of
emissions compatible with this stabilisation of 2.4 GTC or 0.46 tonnes of carbon per
planetary inhabitant per year based on 1990 world population figures. The authors take
this value to be a universal sustainability norm and use it to determine, on the basis of
real emissions, the countries “in credit” (emitting less than the norm) and the countries
“in debit” (emitting more than the norm). They then put a value on these quantities using
the average value of the macroeconomic coefficient for the energetic efficiency of fossil
fuel (GNP per tonne of carbon ratio). From this, they arrive at an evaluation of the
“debt” taken out each year by the Northern “debtor” countries with the Southern
“creditor” countries.
This example shows how turning the idea of sustainability into a legitimacy norm
depends on a group of operations which, in this case, have only been partially carried
out and even then only in the form of legal fiction: 6  the scientific definition of a
function of climatic and biospheric response to various levels of greenhouse-effect
emissions;  the socio-economic evaluation of the consequences of induced changes and
the assessment of sustainability thresholds, or rather unsustainability;  an international
authority’s appropriation of the rights to the atmosphere previously available to all;  the
international distribution, based on a rule deemed fair, of rights compatible with the
chosen sustainability norm;  and the definition of transitional mechanisms, incentives
and penalties to ensure compliance with the new rights.
If sustainability is to become an acknowledged principle of legitimacy and be
accorded the means it needs, all of these stages should pass through the filter of
                    
 5 This militant organisation managed to gain entry to the international institutional climate talks and
take part in the International Negotiations Committee meeting on the climate agreement held in New York in
March 1993. The figures that it presented at this meeting were presented by the United Nations Inter Press
Service Daily Journal (Dayal, 1993) as coming from an “environmental research body”.
 6 Today’s world of sustainability is riddled with legal fiction. Examples of this are the equal right of
each global citizen to the atmosphere, historical responsibility, and the “natural debt” accumulated by the
countries that have taken more than their fair share of the common patrimony formed by the atmosphere and
the earth’s natural resources. To see how such fiction may become systematised, see for example Agarwal and
Narain (1992).
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justification, notably regarding the invention of appropriate tests to resolve
disagreements and arbitrate contradictory claims. The logic of denunciation, as
employed by the GCI, relies on the affirmation of a set of definitions and principles
presented as self-evident and woven into a coherent whole in order to produce an effect
of revelation about the “real nature” of a situation. Clearly, a form of constitution of the
reality and a “superior common principle” need to be presumed within this architecture.
This is epitomised by the formula, presented as axiomatic by the GCI, which posits that
“survival and equity are now inextricably linked. ”
4. The Semantics and Axiomatic of Sustainability as a Principle of Legitimacy
Denunciation operations can only have an impact on the targeted situations or parties if
the elements used to back up the arguments are themselves consistent enough to impress.
A group of concepts marks out the territory of the new principle by introducing a whole
host of topics:  ecological equilibria, sustainability considered here in a more technical
sense, the common patrimonial earth, equity for future generations, the finite and fragile
world, survival, responsibility, irreversibility, complexity, and the precautionary
principle. These concepts slot together to form a founding myth from which all argument
emanates. This myth is as following:  the present end-of-century generations have
become a “geological force” under the combined effect of technological and
demographic growth. They are discovering that the planet is a finite, fragile world and
that they are exhausting its resources and threatening its ecological equilibria, thereby
provoking scarcity whose reign will extend to all the generations to come. This new
power acquired by man gives him a new responsibility towards future generations:  the
earth and its resources belong to all generations and, as such, are humanity’s common
patrimony to be preserved and managed for the good of all. The very survival of the
human race, the supreme common good, is at stake. In spite of the complexity of our
world, which still prevents science from always providing for certitude, the
irreversibility of the major developments affecting the planet demands immediate action
in line with a precautionary principle. This principle dictates the adoption of safety
measures in the name of the superior ecological interest of humanity whenever there is a
doubt.
This myth is sufficiently consistent to make sustainability a serious candidate as a
justification principle for development choices. This is illustrated by the fact that the
main organisations involved in this field feel obliged to produce declarations,
programmes and doctrines on “sustainable development”. We are not just talking about
the UN organisations, but also about such bodies as the World Bank (1992) (in their
Report on World Development), the European Community (CEC 1992), and the
International Chamber of Commerce (1991).
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Figure 1. The Axiomatic Base for Legitimate Orders of Justification: The “City” Model
following L. Boltanski and L. Thévenot (1991)
A1. The Principle of Common Humanity
• What members of the “City” have in common:  mutual recognition and
symmetric relationship
• Distinction established between human persons and non-human beings
• Only human persons are the members of the “City”
A2. The Principle of Dissimilarity
• There are several possible social positions for
members
A3. The Principle of Common Dignity
• Each member has an equal formal potential of access to
the various social positions
A4. The Principle of Greatness Ordering
• Differences in social positions are turned into an ordering of
greatness
A5. The Principle of Sacrifice (or Investment Formula)
• Access to “Greatness” (upper social positions) has a cost, implies a
sacrifice
A6. The Principle of Superior Common Good
• Having the position of a Great member provides a common good for all
members, and not only a personal satisfaction (happiness, power,
reputation...)
306 OLIVIER GODARD
Here can be seen a number of the attributes essential to a principle of legitimacy
in modern societies. First, the aim is to be able to rank projects, actions, countries,
companies, behaviour and situations in terms of their sustainability.  Corresponding to
this ordering, assuming a set of different states, is a hierarchy of social value going from
the least sustainable to the most sustainable. The actors and projects at the top of the
sustainability ordering produce a common superior good, shared by all humanity
through all its generations, including the less significant parties in the sustainability
order. These “leaders” also give the others a much-needed benchmark and example to be
followed by those of lower ranking within the present generation. In addition, they
ensure the dignity of the present generation with regard to generations to come.  Lastly,
the content of the debates on the economic costs of policies claiming to be in keeping
with the order of sustainability considerations shows that moving up in this hierarchy
involves a sacrifice in the form of forsaking a consumption of material goods,
restrictions imposed on technological developments and a withdrawal from
anthropocentric utilitarianism in relations with nature.
In this formulation, four of the axioms making up the “city” model as described
by Boltanski and Thévenot (1991, pp. 96-102), laid out in Figure 1 below, are thus
potentially satisfied:  the principle of difference (A2), the principle of Greatness
ordering (A4), the investment and sacrifice formula (A5), and the principle of the
common good resulting from the activity of the Great (A6).
At the same time, the principle of sustainability establishes a new shared world --
that is, a new reference reality, operating in novel time-space continua as regards
principles of legitimacy. The biosphere and the planet Earth with their exchanges and
circulations, their regulations and interlocking hierarchies, produce a dense and
diversified space distinct in content and dimension compared with the usual concepts of
space taken into account in other legitimacy universes (such as civic space, broken down
into national territories, and market space, a homogenous ground for the circulation of
merchandise free from domestic and political obstacles). Long-term time horizon is, for
the first time ever, interwoven with action time and drawing closer to the time constants
used by the universal sciences (ecological developments, geomorphology, etc.). 7
On the operational level, the sustainability myth offers an extremely wide-ranging
scope, from which we extract three aspects for comment:
  • We generally expect a legitimacy test to link the local (the situation provoking the
disagreement) to a well-formed general shaping relating to a superior principle,
expressed in the codification of rules and the standardisation of the objects to be
used to carry out the tests. The aim of the sustainability principle is, indeed,
                    
 7 For example, the implementation of the “historical responsibility” concept results in proposals for
rules governing the distribution of atmospheric rights to be organised “here and now”, which include
greenhouse-gas emissions since the pre-industrial period:  see Agarwal and Narain (1992).
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precisely to provide a way of judging local realities and processes in the light of
their more general significance at upper levels reaching as far up as the entire
biosphere. A catch of fish is interpreted with regard to the survival of the species.
A soil irrigation technique is evaluated using the yardstick of global trends in
cultivable surface areas, productivity and the demographic boom. A change
affecting space, such as deforestation, is considered from the point of view of its
contribution to greenhouse gas emissions or the balance of biodiversity. This
ability to give meaning to local phenomena by linking them to a general
consideration is undeniably an essential attribute of any principle of legitimacy.
  • The situations that the principle sets out to cover include both scientifically
stabilised universes, in which causal relations and the representation of potential
damage are deemed sufficiently well-formed, and the scientifically controversial
universes where this is not the case. The precautionary principle is supposed to
provide an adequate judgement criterion for this second type of situation
(Cameron and Wade-Gery, 1995).
  • The consideration of a humanity with an indefinite number of generations, with its
implications in terms of responsibility towards the future and the common
patrimony to be passed on, provides the grounds for the obligation imposed on
the “rich” to transfer to their most underprivileged contemporaries the means
needed to enable them to assume their sustainability responsibilities towards
future generations and, in so doing, to acquire the minimum dignity required to be
a member of a humanity ordered according to the norm of sustainability.  In other
words, in the sustainability order, the principle of intergenerational equity
establishes a principle of intragenerational equity instead of conflicting with it as
is thought by some. 8
So is all this for the better?  Can we conclude that sustainability is already a well-
formed principle of legitimacy?  We do not believe so. Admittedly, the mark of the
“city” model’s “common humanity” axiom (A1) can be seen in the last argument given,
showing how the intergenerational equity requirement includes the need for a form of
intragenerational equity. Yet it is precisely over the respect of this axiom (A1), and also
                    
 8 In her study of the principle of intergenerational justice, Edith Brown-Weiss (1989, pp. 44-45) has
observed: “the principle of the conservation of access implies that all people should have minimal access to
the common patrimony. (...) insofar as some of them are too poor to have effective access, the others should
help them to gain this access. (...) we cannot successfully conserve the natural and cultural resources for our
descendants without conserving the environment in which they live.  Consequently, we should help the
underprivileged strata of our community to enable them to fulfil their conservation obligations.”  Robert
Solow (1992, 1993) has questioned this presumption by posing a paradox of distributive equity:  if the crux
of sustainability is a concern for the fate of far-off future generations, surely this welfare concern should be
turned even more to the advantage of those in the depths of misery today.  Yet this concern will be reflected
by more consumption and less investment which, in Solow’s concept of sustainability centred on the
maintenance of capital, means that sustainability itself comes into question.
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the axiom requiring “equal power of access to different states” (A3), that the norm of
sustainability stumbles as a general principle of legitimacy. Also in question is the
present ability of this principle to produce practical tests capable of ordering the
situations and putting an end to disagreements and denunciations.
5. Weaknesses and Inconsistencies in the Principle of Sustainability
Mainstream economists, in particular, have gleefully set about dismantling the notion of
sustainability and exposing its lack of precision, its inconsistencies and its distinct
inferiority relative to the concepts emanating from the classical theory of optimal growth
(for example, Nordhaus, 1992). More generally, most of the analysts writing about the
subject of sustainability start their papers by underscoring the vagueness surrounding the
notion and the large number of conflicting definitions and concepts. Michael Marien
(1992, p.732) epitomises a widespread feeling in the introduction to his review of the
English literature on the subject. He considers “that there are too many authors
presenting competing, complementary and sometimes contradictory messages about
what the problems are and what should be done to construct a viable future.” This
statement hints, to say the least, at the fact that as a principle of legitimacy, the
sustainability concept is not yet ready to take on the role expected from it. Discussion on
this matter could cover wide territories;  we will limit our remarks to a few theoretical
points.
Two divergent perspectives, generally called anthropocentric and biocentric,
coexist in the literature on sustainability. The biocentric view has been contemplated by
many. Callicot (1992), for example, puts forward a case for taking into account an
intrinsic value of living beings in the name of a new scientific understanding of the
incorporation of the human species in the biosphere. Other experts take stands as a result
of concern about the strict application of a functionalist or narrowly economic
anthropocentric concept (e.g., Kuik and Verbruggen, 1991). Yet in all cases, the
biocentric view comes up against a major problem in that it violates the axiom (A1) of
common humanity, which defines the reference community as a community of people
who mutually acknowledge each other as humans and fellow men. This difficulty is
stressed by Paul Ricoeur (1993, p.15) when he states that he believes the notions of
rights and duty cannot be extended beyond the human sphere. Each time a hypothesis
makes ecological sustainability an end in itself and an organisational principle for action
and management, it is rendered invalid from the point of view of the “city” model.
The anthropocentric view obviously does not have this particular problem, but
does suffer from two other important problems. To be suited to the stakes of
sustainability, a principle of legitimacy has to be able to provide a coherent and
satisfactory representation of the future. The “city” model imposes a synchronic order
on the people and social states by focusing on the conditions for reaching an agreement
between the people making up society and having to determine the conditions of their
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co-operation and the distribution of social goods. This is why the axiom of common
humanity (A1), which establishes a basic difference between the humans faced with the
problem of a mutual agreement and the other beings, also posits a fundamental
equivalence and symmetry between all the members of the human community
considered. Yet time does introduce a gap between remote generations. This split has
two features:
  • These generations are not both represented in the same community and cannot
contact each other in order to agree on a common good;
  • They are in an extremely lop-sided relationship, as the former generations create
the later generations and give them (impose on them?), in that same motion, their
identity and the world in which they are going to have to live their life.
It is ultimately from the decision of the former generations that the later generations
come into existence or not.
This line of argument is also taken up by those who consider that under no
circumstances can the present generations wrong future generations. To each
behavioural regime, however little it may modify the present generations’ decisions,
correspond future generations who will be different in both quality and quantity. That is
to say, those yet to be born will not be the same people. They will therefore not be in a
position to criticise their parents for the state of the world they have left them as they
would not have come into the world had their parents behaved differently. An attempt
could probably be made to overcome this “problem of identity” by, for example, siding
with the utilitarian point of view (Beckerman and Pasek, 1993;  Birnbacher, 1994). Yet
the clearest implication of this is that intergenerational justice cannot easily be addressed
as a problem concerning the optimisation of a distribution of well-being. It would be
more suitably viewed in terms of minimum basic rights to be guaranteed so as to ensure
the human dignity of all humans in all generations, and of the desire of present
generations to pass on things they consider to be the most critical for defining their own
identity and being rightly acknowledged by their remote successors. It is basically the
value of the responses to this problem of asymmetry that tests a principle of legitimacy’s
suitability to the situation to be decided on when a sustainability risk is raised.
All the hypotheses picturing the successive generations as a human community
similar to that of a society of co-present people, such as extensions of Rawls’ veil of
ignorance to the intergenerational relationship, are unrealistic as they ignore the
fundamental asymmetry introduced by the procreation relationship. This holds true in
spite of the fact that, since the condemnation of eugenesis, attempts are being made to
tone down the implications of this relationship as much as possible by, for example,
subjecting demographics to statistical laws on which forecast approaches can be based
rather than calling on a principle of responsibility. These hypotheses also err by
overlooking the fact that the successive generations are incapable of having the same
power of access to the different social states (axiom A3) as all the accessible states
considerably change over time (the “irreversibility effect”).
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An alternative solution is proposed by analysts such as Rémi Barbier (1992),
who place the representation of future generations within the community formed by the
present generations. The argument is as follows. As environmental changes are the
remote “carriers of existence” from present generations to future generations, symmetry
can be re-established by placing the representation of the latter in the present time.
Generally speaking representation techniques are now well developed, though Northern
societies are often said to be affected nowadays by a crisis of the political
representation. In principle, this solution has the big advantage of reinstating an initial
community made up exclusively of co-present members. Yet it remains to be seen how
the representation mechanism can be compatible with the common dignity axiom (A3).
As a social state, the representation function must also be able to be accessible to all and
must not lead to the creation of two classes within the community:  those only entitled to
speak for themselves and those authorised to speak for the absent third parties. Above
all, it remains to be seen how this capacity to represent future generations can possibly
be authenticated, as the usual validation procedures (elections, etc.) are not available in
this case. What tests could be used to judge self-proclaimed and contradictory claims to
represent future generations?
Lastly, the general virtue of tests is that, if accepted, they can put an end to
conflicts and disagreements in a way that disallows the introduction of rhetoric. Yet in
order to do this, a world of well-defined and standardised things (devices, technical
objects, natural beings), on which all members of society can firmly rely, need to be
constituted. However, the context of scientific controversies and incomplete
understanding so characteristic of knowledge about the global environment actually
reflects the inability of existing ecological objects (CO2 emissions, the spread of
chemical compounds in the sea, deforestation, etc.) to establish guaranteed equivalence
with future states so as to be considered as the legitimate representatives of these future
states. The social pacification expected from the world of objects is a cruel
disappointment here. The same shortcoming is found in the link between local and
general phenomena. Complexity is the name given to the lack of information and
knowledge available to the human observer to give an account of the general sense
based on partial knowledge of the local mechanisms and realities (Atlan, 1979). It
therefore becomes perilous to attempt to make general sense of local phenomena in any
other than a prudent and conjectural fashion, but this also opens the way to strategies of
stakeholders backing contradictory interpretations. This has led us, in a different
context, to underscore the “entangled hierarchy” structure underlying the concept of the
environment. This concept is caught between a reduction to the self-centred logic of the
human system and the all-encompassing presumed, but elusive, view of the environment
as a metasystem (Godard and Salles, 1991).
In view of these problems, the question should doubtless be raised as to
whether sustainability is really a new generic principle or whether it should rather be
looked as an extension of existing principles of legitimacy to a new field of action and
concern. In this case, the rhetoric and tests of sustainability could be reduced to classic
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tried-and-tested rhetoric and tests. Take the example of the equity characteristic of the
“civic city”:  the fundamental equality of rights and freedoms for the citizens of the
world, and the inference of a charter of rights and obligations for everyone based on
exercising a general will leading to such concepts as the “equal right to the atmosphere”
posited by Agarwal and Narain (1992, pp. 190-195). Everyone would agree that this
type of equity is strongly present and even dominant in the sustainability doctrines put
forward today and in the proposals claiming to take their inspiration from them. Does
this then mean that sustainability is nothing more than an attempt to both extend the
“civic” principle to all humanity, regardless of national borders and the democratic
communities they encompass, and to subject to it the economic development processes
typical of the contemporary period, sheltered from industrial and market principles?
With such a reduction, we would definitely lose something of the heroic innovation. Yet
we might gain in efficiency, as the existing principles of legitimacy come with
recognised tried-and-tested credentials.
We will study this question by looking at the way in which different “cities”
construct intertemporal equivalence, because it is here where the main problem lies.
6. The Various Legitimate Ways to Ensure Equivalence with the Future
Amongst the principles of legitimacy that have currency in modern societies, only two --
the domestic city and the industrial city -- explicitly incorporate temporality into the
world they create. The domestic city is organised around procreation relationships and is
therefore directed by the past and steered by traditional values. The industrial city is
steered by values of efficiency and progress and is organised around the capacity of
machines and technology to ensure equivalence with the future via production. The
other principles rely on various devices to translate temporal situations into standardised
situations that fit in with their corresponding worlds. We will consider just three
equivalencies here:  the domestic and the industrial as already mentioned, and also the
market world (in view of its incontestable political significance). 9
                    
 9 The market world is, as we will discuss below, a world of trade and contract availability where
values can readjust at any time, without memory or future. As regards other legitimacy orders, the reference
point for the civic world is the formation of a general will coming from free and equal citizens and its key test
is the elective process that commits the society’s members “here and now”;  and the inspired world
admittedly evinces a reference to another era, but this other era is essentially removed from a time context and
only takes on the superficial appearance of a past or future time.
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6.1 DOMESTIC EQUIVALENCE: THE PATRIMONIAL FORM
The “domestic city” gives rise to the notion of patrimony, which co-ordinates two
functions.  The first is a synchronic function of the subject’s strategic adaptation, in both
material and identity terms, to life’s unforeseen events. The second is a diachronic
transmission function through which the management of a patrimony is differentiated
from the management of a capital (Godard, 1990;  Godard and Salles, 1991). This
construction, which recognises the tension between these two functions, only manages to
stand up with the help of hypotheses about the subjects of the domestic city:  they form a
line, house or body, that is, an intergenerational patrimonial group, which is the true
symbolic owner of the patrimony. This change of pertinent reference subjects, from
individuals to intergenerational groups, ensures the unification of the two, potentially
antagonistic, functions by linking them to each other. The present holder of the
patrimony has to survive in order to ensure the proper management and transmission of
the patrimony that he has received. He therefore has a duty to use this patrimony for his
personal survival when circumstances so dictate, especially since the identity value of
the patrimony relies less on the materiality of the goods making it up than on the
personal transmission chain formed for them. At the same time, the survival of the
patrimonial group can be ensured by the assumed transmission.
This type of construction proves to be soundest in the traditional world, where
the make-up of the patrimony is void of ambiguity as the patrimony to be passed on is
structured by the patrimony received. So to make the adaptive value of the bequeathed
patrimony consistent, the world in question has to be predictable and slow to evolve. In
a world subject to an intense process of global change, there is a growing contradiction
between the two methods of patrimonial identification:  the identity value associated
with the legacy and the now extremely uncertain adaptive value focused on presence in
the world, such as this world becomes.
The adoption of the patrimonial form to understand sustainability in the
contemporary context presents another substantial problem in that the order of
importance in the domestic world has to be inverted. The prevailing order is constructed
according to a degree of proximity and intimacy with the “great men” of this world, so
as to label the symbolic goods bearing the identity of these “great men” and the
patrimonial group that they personify. Wild, non-propertied nature and the planet’s
global equilibria are therefore the strangest beings you could possibly find described as
patrimony!
Lastly, the patrimonial form built on the procreation relationship will normally
expose itself to the asymmetry initiated by this relationship, with all the destructive
consequences that this can have for the principle of legitimacy. The first way of
alleviating the asymmetrical effect consists of developing the reversal of roles in the
transmission chain itself:  the heir who has received and cannot give his inheritance back
to his benefactor has a duty to give to a third party, who will thus receive from him. Yet
this does not reinstate the symmetry of persons required by the axiom (A1). It merely
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reinstates the symmetry of roles, which ensures compliance with the axiom (A3) of equal
power of access to social states. The second possible solution consists of realising that
the intergenerational asymmetry in this case represents a common feature of a society
formed by the only generations present, whose members are all placed in the same
transmission logic in the name of the continuation of the patrimonial group to which
they belong. Therefore, each member of this community should be recognised a basic
dignity in the form of a patrimonial interest to consolidate. This dignity can be used as
the basis for generating links and searching for agreements. 10  In so doing, the society is
no longer directly organised as an intergenerational community, but merely as a
community of living beings, which restores compliance with the axiom (A1). However,
the price of this is a common submission to an external principle, which turns the
members of the society into instruments and thus undermines their credentials as
persons.
To sum up, the patrimonial form has the potential to make sense of the
sustainability question by being organised around a transmission logic.  Yet it stumbles
over three problems that are not easily overcome:
  • The vagueness of the description of the patrimony to be passed on as soon as
the question is considered from the point of view of the value of adaptation and
survival and as soon as the traditional references, turned towards the past, are
no longer operative;
  • The reversal of the order of importance that would be required to mobilise the
patrimonial form to contain those objects, Nature, least well-suited to this
status;
  • The asymmetry of the procreation relationship, which can be completely
overcome only by making the society’s members lose their credentials as
persons, following their subservience to an external principle.
6.2 INDUSTRIAL EQUIVALENCE: SUBSTITUTABILITY THROUGH
TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENTS
Robert Solow (1993) expresses a position well-established with a number of economists:
that most natural resources and environmental assets have a value, which is not based on
what they are, but on their services and functions. As such, they can easily be replaced
by using technology and investment, i.e., capital formation. Unsustainability does not
therefore generally reside in the use of non-renewable assets, but in the fact that the
profit derived from this use is not reinvested. Solow acknowledges the irreplaceable
                    
 10 Here resides the principle underlying the intervention and decision-making aid approach, which
has developed in France under the name of “negotiated patrimonial management”. This approach endeavours
to encourage the appearance of methods of co-operative management of environmental and natural resource
commons (forests, water tables, rivers, etc.) of interest to a whole host of social actors. See Jean de
Montgolfier and Jean-Marc Natali (1987).
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uniqueness of certain exceptional assets such as the Lincoln Memorial and the Yosemite
National Park in the United States, but asserts that such assets are limited in number and
cannot therefore form the crux of the debate on sustainability. The result of all this is
that the sustainability norm proposed does not take the form of a general command to
conserve such or such a resource, and even less a command to conserve all the natural
elements in an unaltered state. Beings in the industrial world are only worth anything if
they are productive and used to satisfy needs. So instead, the command is to indefinitely
preserve the productive capacity of human societies, bearing in mind that the total
capital of the society extends beyond its own productive facilities (factories, machines
and buildings) to encompass everything that contributes to producing well-being, ergo
including human capital and natural capital.
To what extent does the formula of investment in production capacities and
technological research provide a sufficient basis for ensuring sustainability?  This is
obviously a question for debate. There are at least three angles of attack available:
  • The time period pertinent to industrial activity, i.e., that over which the
investment formula can credibly form equivalence (investment in a given
factory with a sufficient probability of equivalence with the supply of industrial
products for n years to come), is a lot shorter than the long, intergenerational
time addressed by sustainability.  In other words, industrial equivalence skirts
around the question of time asymmetry rather than really overcoming it.
  • Industrial equivalence is based on the paradigm of a mastery of technological
devices. This in itself implies full knowledge about the performances of the
objects used in both the closed and controlled spaces of their industrial lives
and in the open spaces represented by the consumer’s habitat, the physical
environments and the ecosystems. Yet industrial processes do contain an
irreducible element of ignorance, which is revealed in the event of technical
faults, accidents and sometimes technological catastrophes (Lagadec, 1981;
Wynne, 1992) and can even be revealed later when scientific analyses find
diffuse pollution phenomena. Beyond the industrial universe’s paradigm of
expertise in a closed and functional universe within a short time framework, the
long-term reality is that of an uncontrolled dispersion and slow erosion of
natural objects that technology cannot substitute. In fact, the very question of
sustainability has been raised when industrial and technological investment has
proven not being able to ensure controlled equivalence over the long term.
Doubt is therefore cast on the ability of industrial tests to adjudge the
sustainability of economic development.
  • Technology and investment both depend on a prior concentration of substantial
means which, by definition, are not equally accessible to all. They therefore
provide only a partial response to the problem of sustainability, at best
reserving it for a mere fraction of the human community.
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6.3 MARKET EQUIVALENCE: THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
The market world forges no temporality and does not, therefore, enable the question of
inter-temporal equivalence to be addressed directly. Nevertheless, the example of the
market contract is put forward as a formula for solving the problem of the sustainability
norm based on a similar set-up, in this regard, to that of the “domestic world”:  the
relationship formed between two successive generations when they are overlapping and
are therefore co-present and able to enter into a contract with each other. Karl Göran
Mäler (1992) has proposed a model based on the reasoning underlying Hotelling’s law
of rent formation on a non-renewable resource market (the rent reflects the resource’s
expected price increase due to its future increased scarcity, which makes it profitable to
conserve a certain level of the resource for future sale). This overlapping generations
model solves the problem along the following lines. It is in the best interests of the
young, in a productive phase, to preserve a stock of environmental resources used as
production input in order to resell it later, when they retire and are consumers, to the
new young who will take their place. They will draw an appreciable income from this on
which to live when they join the class of the elders. An optimal conservation trajectory
is traced from contract through contract, as long as the environmental resource is
appropriated and the agents can form rational expectations as to the sales prospects
available to them. Consequently, the contract between two successive generations is said
to be sufficient to ensure a fair representation of the preferences of all the future
generations to come.
This is an elegant solution as it entails two attractive factors. First of all, it re-
establishes a situation of real symmetry between the generations in compliance with the
axiom (A1), which is that of two partners to a mutually profitable contract.  Secondly, it
focuses attention and management on the concrete resources making up the world of the
present generations, i.e. the most well-known objects, and thus avoids a function of
representation of future conditional beings linked by evolutionary paths.  It reaches a
classical conclusion, from the point of view of theoretical concepts, by reducing the
question of sustainability to a problem of imperfect information (agents’ expectations
cannot be rational) and incomplete markets (many environmental resources can neither
be appropriated nor traded).
So, can the solution be convincing when applied to the justification processes?
At the very least, it lacks well-constructed tests on which a judgement can be based. As
with a house of cards, all the contracts are built on the last one, the contract which is to
be concluded at the end of history. This event can but be conjectural, and encumbered
by all the limits encountered by existing beings (persons and objects) as regards forming
equivalence with future beings. For example, to what extent are the preferences of future
generations similar or different to ours?  To what extent might the technological




All in all, neither the path of the generic principle nor that of the reduction to existing
principles would appear to be fully satisfactory as the basis for establishing the
legitimacy of sustainable development or as a way of making sustainability a principle of
legitimacy by its own. We should probably resign ourselves to seeing in this idea a
composite construction, still striving towards the formation of a new “superior common
principle”, without this principle yet being able to be completely clarified and validated.
What we have here is an example of the sort of “compromise” described by
Boltanski and Thévenot (1991, p.338):  “In the compromise, the participants abandon
the idea of clarifying the principle of their agreement but endeavour to maintain a frame
of mind aiming at the common good.” If we want to consolidate the compromise
developing around sustainability, it would be well advised to seek the support of tests
using well-formed objects. To this end, steps should be taken to move the emphasis
away from long-term and unknowable sustainability requirements and closer to second-
best criteria focused on the transitional developments and possible risks of intentional
human action, the ways of managing the linking of the different temporalities in play --
as regards the biophysical phenomena, their understanding and the main worlds of
legitimacy (Godard, 1992) -- and the introduction of deliberation within the present
generations as to what they feel best describes their identity, those things they would like
to pass on.
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